More Competitive, More Efficient? The 2013 European Commission Defence Communication.  Security Policy Brief No. 49, September 2013 by Fiott, Daniel
  1 
More Competitive, More Efficient? The 2013 
European Commission Defence Communication  
Daniel Fiott 
The  European  Commission  has  now 
released  its  2013  Communication  on 
defence-industrial  policy.  But  does  the 
latest  set  of  policy  ideas  offer  European 
defence-industrial  cooperation  any  new 
impetus?  This  Brief  argues  that  while  the 
majority of the Commission’s initiatives are 
not  new,  some  much  needed  ideas  have 
made  their  way  into  the  latest 
Communication. 
The  European  Commission  has  now  released 
its  renewed  vision o f   European  defence-
industrial  cooperation  called  Towards  a  More 
Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector. 
It is a Communication that can be characterised 
as  an  interesting  hybrid  of  regulatory  and 
project-based  proposals.  The  Commission 
began  thinking  seriously  about  European 
defence  in  1996  with  the  release  of  its  first 
Communication; the latest version is the sixth 
since  this  time.  Indeed,  not  perhaps  since  its 
2003  defence  Communication  –  developed  in 
the  context  of  the  establishment  of  the 
European  Security  and  Defence  Policy,  the 
convention on the Future of Europe and the 
then  impending  EU  enlargement  – h a s  a  
Commission Communication on defence been 
so eagerly anticipated. 
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This  policy  brief  argues  that  while  the 
proposals  contained  in  the  latest 
Communication  offer  some  important  new 
initiatives,  a  lot  of  the  proposals  have  been 
carried  forward  from  past  Communications 
and  as  such  highlight  the  continuity  in  the 
problems  faced  by  the  Commission,  vis-à-vis 
the  member  states,  in  defence-industrial 
cooperation.  While  much  of  the  latest 
Communication  is  not  new  in  scope  or 
ambition,  however,  it  is  being  released  at  a 
time of considerable uncertainty and pressure 
for the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB) and will feed into the 
discussions at the European Council meeting 
on  the  “state  of  defence  in  Europe”  in 
December 2013. 
 
THE  COMMISSION  AND  DEFENCE-
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 
Before  any  analysis  of  the  latest 
Communication  can  begin,  it  is  necessary  to 
contextualise  the  Commission’s  role  in 
European  defence-industrial  cooperation.  It 
should  first  be  recognised  that  the 
Commission’s  involvement  in  European 
defence-industrial cooperation has a relatively 
long  pedigree;  its  involvement  predates  the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) (established 
in 2004), for example. The Commission has a 
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set of specific regulatory tools that it can use to 
influence  the  direction  of  defence-industrial 
cooperation.  It  can,  for  example,  use  the 
treaties  to  potentially  ensure  fair  competition 
and  transparency  in  procurement  but  it  does 
not – as is the case with the EDA – manage 
collaborative capability programmes on behalf 
of and in cooperation with the member states. 
Aware of its limitations, the Commission has to 
be  rather  strategic  in  using  the  tools  it  does 
have at its disposal.  
 
It is interesting to note the continuity across 
all  of  the  Communications  on  defence  since 
1996. Indeed, it is possible to discern a pattern 
since  the  first  Communication  regarding  the 
rationale,  problems  of  and  actions  required f o r  
European defence-industrial cooperation.  
 
For the Commission the rationale has always 
been  clear.  The  EU  requires  a  European 
Defence  Equipment  Market  (EDEM)  and 
EDTIB  in  order  to  maintain  high-skilled 
employment in Europe, to support small- and 
medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  to  ensure 
that  European  states  through  the  Common 
Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP)  and 
NATO have autonomous capabilities and that 
the defence sector delivers value for money for 
European citizens. 
 
The Commission has also been consistent 
on  the  problems  impeding  greater  European 
defence-industrial cooperation. It has long held 
that  the  internal  market  for  defence  is  still 
fragmented; defence budgets and defence R&D 
funds are in chronic decline; there is a need for 
closer  civilian/military  and  industrial/defence 
linkages; military capability development needs 
rationalising; and European defence equipment 
requires  greater  standardisation  and 
interoperability. 
 
Regarding  the  actions  required t h e  
Commission  has  long  maintained  that  it  will 
help  overcome  the  obstacles t o  g r e a t e r  
European  defence-industrial  cooperation b y  
challenging the member states’ application of 
Article 346 – which allows member states to 
withhold  information  and  restrict  defence-
related trade in the name of national security; 
using  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF)  and 
other  structural  funds  to  assist  SMEs  and 
defence-sector  workers;  assisting  European 
firms gain access to United States (US) defence 
markets;  reflecting  on  how  it  can  apply 
competition  rules  to  the  defence  sector; 
looking at ways to boost security of supply and 
information for member states; and developing 
a  security-related  research  agenda.  The 
Commission  has  made  important  steps 
forward on this front, of course, most notably 
through  the  adoption  of  two  Directives  in 
2009  on  intra-EU  defence-related  product 
transfers (Directive 2009/43/EC) and defence 
and  security  procurement  (2009/81/EC) 
known as the “Defence Package”.  
 
THE 2013 DEFENCE COMMUNICATION 
When  reading  the  latest  offering  from  the 
Commission, therefore, one must be careful to 
decipher what is genuinely innovative in policy 
terms and what has been on the agenda since 
at least the mid-1990s. In this regard, the latest 
Communication  has  listed  7  priority  action 
points – some new, some not – including:  
 
1)  Strengthening the internal market for defence by 
actively  monitoring  the  openness  of 
member states’ defence markets; preparing 
guidance notes on the application of the 
defence  Directives;  ensuring  the  rapid 
phasing  out  of  member  state  offsets; 
ensuring  coherent  application  of  Article 
346;  issuing  a  Green  Paper  on  improving 
defence-security  industrial  security  of 
supply; and establishing a central register 
for general licenses on intra-EU defence 
transfers. 
 
2)  Promoting a more competitive European defence 
industry by developing standardisations for 
dual-use  products  with  defence 
applications  such  as  Chemical  Biological   3 
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Radiological  &  Nuclear  (CBRN)  and 
Unmanned  Aerial  Vehicles  (UAVs); 
ensuring a common European approach to 
product  certification  for  military 
airworthiness;  screening  critical  defence-
related  raw  materials;  establishing  greater 
linkages  between  defence-industrial 
regional clusters of excellence; supporting 
defence-related  SMEs  across  the  EU 
through  the  use  of  Horizon  2020;  and 
using the ESF to develop skills needed in 
the defence sector and to re-train workers. 
 
3)  Increasing  civil-military  synergies  and  innovation 
by launching pre-commercial procurement 
schemes for cutting-edge prototypes such 
as CBRN detection. This means that the 
Commission can invest in R&D projects in 
order  to  assist  companies  share  the  risks 
and benefits of designing, prototyping and 
testing  products,  to  create  the  optimum 
conditions  for  commercialisation  and  to 
pool t he  efforts  of  several  procurers 
without involving state aid. 
 
4)  Developing capabilities by identifying dual-use 
products that can be used to meet CSDP-
related capability shortfalls. 
 
5)  Increasing  civil-defence  space  activities  by 
examining ways to pool and share satellite 
communications;  analysing  how  member 
states  can  maintain  military  satellite 
systems  in  the  future;  and  exploring  the 
possibility of developing a high resolution 
EU  satellite  for  Common  Foreign  and 
Security Policy (CFSP)/CSDP operations. 
 
6)  Designing  a  European  energy  strategy  for  the 
defence sector by developing in tandem with 
the  member  states  a  defence  energy 
concept that reduces energy consumption 
in  defence  estates,  increases  the  use  of 
renewable energies and promotes the use 
of smart grid technologies. 
 
7)  Strengthening  the  international  dimension  by 
integrating  security  and  defence  into  the 
EU’s external trade policy; gaining greater 
access  to  the  US  market  for  European 
firms;  helping  EU  defence  firms  with 
offset  demands  in  third-countries; 
promoting  European  firms  and 
technologies  in  third-country  markets; 
presenting  a  guide  on  strategic  export 
controls. 
 
MORE OF THE SAME? 
Given  the  continuity  over  the  various 
Communications  it  is  not  surprising  to  learn 
that some of its latest policy intentions are not 
that new at all. For example, the Commission 
has consistently made a point about challenging 
the  member  states  on  their  application  of 
Article 346. When the Commission has taken 
relevant member states to the European Court 
of  Justice  (ECJ)  to  challenge  an  Article  346 
situation the Court has tended to rule in favour 
of  the  Commission.  Yet  the  Commission,  by 
consistently referring to the fact that it needs to 
challenge  member  states  more  regularly  and 
effectively  on  Article  346  in  each 
Communication  since  1996,  must  feel  it  can 
still  do  more  in  this  regard.  The  latest 
Communication  yet  again  indicates  that t h e  
Commission will challenge Article 346 cases on 
a consistent basis. 
 
Another area that has been on the agenda 
since  2009  has  been  the  application  of  the 
“defence  package”.  By  their  very  nature 
Directives set the desired end result of policy or 
law (in the case of the “defence package” this 
means  more  liberalised  intra-EU  defence-
related  transfers  and  procurement  processes), 
but it is up to national authorities to adapt laws 
and policies to meet this end in a manner they 
choose.  While  the  task  of  monitoring  each 
national  response  to  the  two  Directives  is 
challenging,  it  remains  unclear w h e t h e r  t h e  
Directives  have  been  beneficial  for  the 
proposed end. Indeed, it would be beneficial to 
have  a  clearer  answer  to  the  question:  what   4 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
tangible  overall  impact  has t h e   Commission’s 
“defence  package” h a d  o n   European  defence 
markets? 
 
Another  issue  of  importance  to  the 
Commission is that of defence spending in the 
member states. Military spending, which is the 
sole  prerogative  of  the  member  states,  is  a 
delicate  issue  for  the  Commission  to  weigh-in 
on.  Nevertheless,  it  does  recognise t h a t  t h e  
problem in Europe is not so much the amount 
being  spent  on  defence b u t  r a t h e r  w h a t  t h e  
existing  money  is  being  spent  on.  The 
Commission understands that much of Europe’s 
defence spending ‘goes to manpower rather than 
the  procurement  of  new  equipment  and 
forward-oriented research’ (2012). Indeed, since 
2006 EU member states have consistently spent 
over  50%  of  total  defence  spending  on 
personnel costs (EDA, 2010). Yet, since 1996 – 
for obvious political reasons – the Commission 
has  been  unwilling  to  make  concrete  political 
recommendations  on  how  EU  member  states 
should spend their defence budgets. 
 
Layoffs in the defence sector – be it military 
personnel and/or defence firm employees – are 
an  inevitable  casualty o f  E u ropean  defence 
restructuring.  The  Commission  estimates  that 
approximately 1.5 million highly skilled workers 
are employed in the defence-industry sector, so 
the sector is sufficiently relevant (Commission, 
2009: p. 17). One idea the Commission has long 
pushed for in its Communications is using the 
ESF and the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) to support, among other things, 
worker  re-training  and  re-skilling.  The 
Commission  has  in  the  past  supported  such 
projects in countries such as France. However, 
the  challenge  facing  any  use  of  the  structural 
funds  in  the  defence  sector  relates  to  the 
economic crisis: in the face of greater demand 
on  the  structural  funds,  the  Commission  will 
have  to  justify  investing  finances  into  the 
defence  sector  as  opposed  to  other  sectors 
equally in need of support. 
 
Another issue that has long been present 
on  the  Commission’s  agenda  is  dual-use 
technologies  and  the  importance  of  SMEs. 
Indeed, the Commission is correct to suggest 
that  SMEs  comprise  a  large  proportion  of 
defence companies with important linkages to 
the  rest  of  the  European  economy,  and  the 
line  between  strictly  military  and  civilian 
technologies is increasingly blurred. SMEs and 
dual-use  technologies  are  the f o c u s  o f  t h e  
Commission’s  activities  in  Europe’s  defence 
markets,  not  just  because  of  market 
composition  but  because  it  allows  the 
Commission to draw on policy tools – such as 
the  structural  funds  and  the  Framework 
Programmes – that cannot strictly be used for 
funding  in  the  military s e c t o r .  In  essence, 
emphasising the civilian and dual-use nature of 
the  defence  sector  as  opposed  to  the  more 
strictly military side plays to the Commission’s 
existing policy tool strengths. 
 
There is good reason for this continuity, as 
it  shows  the  persistent  and  perennial 
challenges  faced  by  the  European 
Commission. Firstly, the Commission is only 
able to use specific legal and policy tools to 
shape defence markets in Europe and it thus 
lacks the full range of powers needed to shape 
the  EDTIB  alone.  Secondly,  member  states 
recognise  that  the  European  Commission  is 
playing the double game of helping with the 
construction  of  an  EDTIB  while 
simultaneously trying to increase its own policy 
powers in the defence-industrial sector. Certain 
member  states  thus  pose  a  countervailing 
resistance  to  the  Commission’s  supranational 
ambitions  in  EDTIB-related  initiatives,  and 
they task other bodies such as the EDA and 
undertake  bi-lateral  agreements  with  each 
other to balance these ambitions. Given these 
two  factors,  the  Commission  should  be 
credited for playing the role it has played so far 
in European defence-industrial cooperation. 
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SO WHAT’S NEW? 
The latest Communication does, however, offer 
a  number  of  innovative  and  potentially 
promising  avenues  for  European  defence.  For 
example, one development is the Commission’s 
move to create policy linkages between the EU’s 
Raw  Material  Initiative  and  critical  material 
supplies  to  the  defence  sector  (as  previously 
called for by Fiott, 2011). The Commission has 
already conducted some important work in the 
field of resource security: the step to include the 
defence  sector  in  these  efforts  is  a  sound 
progression.  Thus,  by  the  end  of  2013  the 
Commission proposes to screen critical defence 
sector  materials  as  part  of  its  overall  Raw 
Materials Strategy. Another important – if overdue 
– initiative on the horizon for security of supply 
relates to foreign investment in and ownership 
of  European  defence  industries  (as  previously 
called for by European Parliament, 2007; Fiott, 
2012).  The  Commission  proposes  to  assist 
member states in maintaining security of supply, 
and  its  proposed  Green  Paper  on  the  control  and 
ownership of critical industrial and technological assets 
on this basis is to be welcomed. 
 
The  Commission  has  also  signaled  its 
intention to assist in boosting the EU’s civilian 
capabilities  under  the  CSDP.  This  is  an 
interesting  avenue  of  work  that  could  see  the 
Commission  play  a  bigger  role  in  CSDP 
capability development, and indeed it intends to 
work with the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) to draw up a joint assessment of dual-
use  capability  needs  for  the  CSDP.  Given  the 
wide-spectrum of capabilities covered under the 
label  “dual-use”  this  could  interestingly  but 
perhaps  controversially  also  include  UAVs. 
However,  space  and  satellite  communication 
capabilities have been listed as priority areas in 
the  Communication.  The  European 
Commission recognises that in the EU ‘there is 
no  structural  link  between  civil  and  military 
space  activities’ ( 2 0 1 3 :  p .  1 2 ).  One  potential 
project  that  the  Commission  will  look  into 
therefore  is  high-resolution  satellite  capabilities 
sourced in the civilian sector for use under the 
CSDP. 
 
Furthermore,  most  interesting  is  the  way 
the  Communication  notes  how  the 
Commission and the EEAS will ‘[o]n the basis 
of  this  assessment  […]  come  up  with  a 
proposal  for  which  capability  needs,  if  any, 
could  best  be  fulfilled  by  assets  directly 
purchased, owned and operation by the Union’ 
(Commission,  2013:  p.  12).  While  the 
Commission will no doubt guard against the 
idea  that  it  will  start  purchasing  military 
equipment, it must be evident to those reading 
the Communication that – if indeed we take 
the  Commission’s  own  understanding  of  the 
blurred lines between the civil-military sectors 
and dual-use technologies – there will be some 
contestation  over  what  is  classed  as  a 
“military” piece of equipment. Nevertheless, as 
has  been  the  case  with  the  Frontex  Agency 
allowing a supranational authority ‘to buy and 
lease  equipment  in  partnership  with  the 
Member  States  could  greatly  improve  the 
shortfalls  in  equipment  required  for  military 
missions’ under the CSDP (Fiott, 2013: p. 59). 
 
Another  project-based  idea  that  the 
European Commission wants to develop is in 
the area of an Energy Strategy for Defence. The 
Commission  recognises  that  Europe’s  armed 
forces  are  among  the  biggest  consumers  of 
energy  in  the  EU.  Accordingly  it  wants  to 
develop  an  energy  concept  to  reduce  the 
energy  consumption  of  Europe’s  armed 
services  and  increase  renewable  energy  and 
smart grid technology usage. By the first half 
of  2014  the  Commission  plans  to  present  a 
guidebook on renewable energies and energy 
efficiency for the defence sector. Having more 
energy efficient militaries in Europe is crucial 
from  a  strategic  as  well  as  economic  and 
environmental  sustainability  perspective.  As 
the EDA has been the pioneer in promoting 
this very concept at the EU-level through its 
“Military  Green”  initiative,  and  because  the 
EDA h a s  greater  linkages  with  the  member   6 
state  armed  services  and  defence  firms,  the 
Commission  has  the  task  of  building  on  the 
EDA’s  work  with  its  own  energy  and 




Even  if  the  European  Commission’s  latest 
Communication  is  far  from  revolutionary,  it 
does give much food for thought. Indeed, in the 
latest  version  it  is  possible  to  notice  an 
interesting  admixture  of  new  and  not  so  new 
legislative  and  project-based  initiatives.  While  the 
Commission  wants  to  continue  utilising  its 
legislative powers, it is increasingly interested in 
project-based initiatives. This can be seen in its 
increasing  involvement  in  dual-use  capability 
initiatives and its realisation that its expertise on 
raw  material  and  energy  issues  can  give  it  a 
greater  stake  in  European  defence-industrial 
cooperation beyond the use of mere legislative 
initiatives. Close coordination with the EDA is, 
however, required given that it – especially in the 
case  of  energy  initiatives  –  is  already  working 
along similar lines. 
 
While  the  member  states  will  perhaps  fall 
short of agreeing to the Commission’s call for a 
European Defence Industrial Strategy, what is clear is 
that  the  Commission’s  latest  Communication 
comes at a crucial time for European defence-
industrial  cooperation.  While  it  can  be 
critiqued  for  repetition,  the  latest 
Communication will surely give extra voice to 
the need for action by the member states on 
the  unsustainability o f  E u r o p e ’s  defence-
industry.  Decreasing  defence  budgets  and 
increasing  international  competition  makes 
ever  clearer  what  has  been  known  for  some 
time:  member  states  cannot  afford  to  go  it 
alone.  Working  more  closely  with  the 
Commission  on  its  latest  round  of  policy 
initiatives may now be a very real necessity for 
the member states. 
 
Daniel  Fiott  is  a  Doctoral  Researcher  at 
the  Institute  for  European  Studies,  Vrije 
Universiteit  Brussel  (IES-VUB)  and  a 
Senior Editor of European Geostrategy. The 
opinions  expressed  in  this  policy  brief  are 
his own and do not reflect in any way the 
official policy or position of the IES-VUB 
or European Geostrategy. 
 
The author would like to thank Dr. Luis 
Simón  for  his  valuable  and  perceptive 
comments on an earlier draft of this policy 
brief.  All  faults  remain  solely  with  the 
author.  
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